政治 - 不是心理学 - 驱动政治

社会心理学家了解保守媒体政治化其观众。但通过重点关注个人,他们错过了如何制定政治变革。

S.在2020年3月的第二周大致速度,许多美国城市,县和各国发出了订单,以关闭工作场所,学校,学院,餐馆和其他聚会,以避免使用Covid-19案件的压倒性的医疗系统。在此,美国反映了世界其他地方;但是,在理所当然的订单之后跟随的是美国独有的。调查后调查,被确定为共和党或保守派的选民更有可能降低Covid-19的严重性than those who identified as Democrat or liberal. The president, on Twitter and in his speeches, and many elected Republican officeholders鼓励人们抗议公众封闭。尽管建议了federal agency he presided over, 这president rarely wore a mask (and ultimately contracted COVID-19). The measures to contain the virus turned into the熟悉的美国战场文化战争。

为什么致命的大流行变得如此特别political在美国?为什么许多公民和政治精英的问题是关于公共卫生的理解,例如,在面具周围审理?为什么这么多共和党选民接受总统明显不准确的(甚至可笑)关于2020年被盗选举的索赔?

这些问题的通常技术答案是争辩说,这是人们对着天生的丑陋和倡导更多教育和扫盲的结果。然而,在过去的十年中,社会心理学家 - 如雨果梅蒂尔昨天没有出生和约翰·回理系统理由理论—拥有先进的不同参数,在想法啊f “motivated reasoning” and “system justification.” This idea has started to find越来越多购买among journalists. Motivated reasoning is the propensity by individuals to read even the validity of sacred facts through the lens of their (political) identity or group membership. In this formulation, people reason their way to conclusions that favor their group.1

矛盾的是,高信息人员更有可能追求动力推理,因为他们有资源和争论他们的技能。随着人们越来越多地推动动机推理,他们最终会政治化,以前可能被认为是理所当然的。

尽管有这些令人着迷的结果,但在适用于政治时,尽管有令人振奋的推理作为误导,不信任和政治化的驾驶员失败。以下是这种心理思想的重大失败:它没有理论机构权力。相反,一切都是问题of communication and persuasion, and the unit of analysis is always an individual. It is true that people are more prone to reasoning in a way that favors their group when their political identity is activated. Yet, the fundamental question is oftenwhy一些问题首先得到了政治化。为了回答这个问题,必须深入了解政治和媒体机构。在美国案例中,它要求我们了解保守派媒体生态系统及其对共和党的影响。

积极的推理和美国政治

Over the past few decades, the scientific and political institutions in the United States have experienced a significant drop in public trust. We can see this when climate deniers question the research on global warming or vaccine skeptics challenge the power of vaccines or when the Trump administration alleges rampant voter fraud without evidence or disputes the photographs showing the size of the crowds at Trump’s inauguration. The usual explanation of this phenomenon is that people are too gullible, too taken in by hucksters and demagogues to see the facts that sit right in front of them.

Hugo Mercier's昨天没有出生对这些丑陋的指控是一个支撑的解毒剂,以及对沟通和推理的社会心理学的理智介绍。Mercier从一个简单的前提开始:为了生存,身体和社会,人类已经开发了一系列认知机制,他们可以通过它们评估他们收到的信息。

这些“开放警惕”的机制使我们开放到新信息,但也对接受它持谨慎态度。它们包括检查是否收到的信息是合理的,以及理解或争论它的能力。新信息的接收者也可以评估名声发件人,基于他们的沟通的前历。如果有足够的不诚实,人们将开始忽视不诚实的人的信息信号。换句话说,远远不可betway体育提现容忍,人类可能过于保守:“如果有的话,我们太难而不是太容易影响了。”

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How Conservatives Waged a War on Expertise

由Kathryn C. Blbowrell

那么,如何解释所有那些着名的人们落下的人在魅力领导者和墓穴的咒语下,或被政治活动的魔力所采取的魔法和潜意识的广告?Mercier认为,当他们到达已经存在的东西时,远非欺骗我们,广告,政治竞选,甚至拼写结合歌剧都是成功的。因此,Hitler很远离人们在咒语下,希特勒取得了成功,因为他能够在人口中使用已经存在于人口中的现有信仰和概念来实现新的目的。说服是非常困难的,当它有效时,它通常只适用于边缘。

Mercier进一步区分了在“直观”与“反思性”信仰方面的开放警惕的运作之间。直观的信念是我们必须采取行动的人;例如,相信当你打开一个门时,地面继续你是一个直观的信念。如果你停止抱着这种信念,你永远不会离开房间。反思性的信念不涉及任何对行动的反响;最多,他们涉及几乎没有后果的行动。那些认为彗星坪乒乓球比萨店的人贩运儿童留下了糟糕的Yelp评论;但只有一个人,Pizzagate射击游戏,将这种反思性的信念转向直觉的人(并让自己被捕)。

但正是因为反思信仰涉及没有任何行动,宣称他们的成本是完全社交的。反思性的信念是一种向一些人展示你在他们身边和疏远别人的人。Mercier认为,越异性的反思信仰,据称,它的可能性就越有可能发出一个群体,人们在一个人身上有多少。

But if this dynamic of open vigilance works quite well in small groups of people who communicate with one another interpersonally, its functioning may get somewhat skewed in a world of mass media. It is still true that persuasion, through political campaigns or advertising, only works at the margins. But the dynamics of the costs of signaling change dramatically. Thus, “fake news”—transparently absurd news items—can be shared by people not because they think they are necessarily true but because the costs of professing them are so low (fights in the comments) and the gains so high (it shows their in-group the lengths they would go to offend the out-group).

S.urprisingly, it is high-information citizens who tend to have the most elaborate justifications for these views if they are asked to explain them. As akey review of the research explains那people are often caught in a “tug-of-war between accuracy and directional motivations.” Thus high-information people are more likely to defend and justify their false views for a politicized situation (which triggers their political identity and directional motivations) than for a nonpoliticized one (which triggers their motivation for accuracy).

心理学或机构?

There is much to recommend in this theory of communication, if only because it disabuses us of the notion that people are gullible and that political divides can be固定的通过“教育”或“扫盲”运动或“理由”是一些真理的最终仲裁者。但其最大的问题是它忽略了机构的力量,以便为信任设定议程和参数。

当社会心理学家对自己的理论建立可能解决他们诊断的问题时,可以看出。在他的书中系统理由理论社会心理学家Johe Jox Jost认为,“可以通过将亲环保举措重新恢复为爱国,并符合保护美国人的生活方式的目标来利用[人民]制度理由动机。”即使他不确定这实际上会努力改变人们的思想。

Mercier自己结束了他的六章(在谣言中解释了谣言,错误的忏悔,假新闻,骗子男人和其他什锦的科目,使用了开放的警惕理论),一个标题为“该怎么办?”。这些部分被讨论到众所周知的“我们”:我们在传播谣言之前从建议中获取建议(并评估它,因为这是一个直观而不是反思的信念),“我们也应该通过提供准确来源来帮助他人我们的意见。“

These are not bad recommendations, but their character points to a major failing of these theories: the “we” is always an individual. They don’t offer an understanding that fits psychology into the broader world of institutions, which, of course, also shape politics.

如何解决政治化的恶性循环?答案较少在理解人类心灵和恢复美国政治和媒体生态系统的情况下更少。

Consider, for instance, the question of mass media. Mercier, rightfully, points out that, contrary to hype, advertising and political campaigning work far less than people think. When they do, it is often because campaigns build on preexisting beliefs. On the other hand, media coverage—the sort that is typically not paid for—works differently. Mercier notes that the media have “the potential to influence public opinion: not by telling people what to think but by telling people思考什么(议程设置),如何最好地了解问题(框架),在评估政治家时使用的标准是什么标准(priming)” (my emphasis). Moreover, just as media institutions can help people evaluate politicians, they can also enter into relationships of trust with their viewers and help their viewers with criteria for evaluating other kinds of facts.

但社会心理学家真的对美国人没有解释media极化。在19世纪,美国的报纸往往是党派。但到了20世纪中叶,报纸和新闻媒体融合了媒体评论家杰罗森所谓的客观性的客观性。从无处可见。“组织地,他们分开了他们的业务和社论分歧,以便新闻业务(收入和广告)不应干扰新闻的报告。在印刷页面上,他们开始通过清楚地描绘它们来保持事实,意见和广告。他们开始通过向每一方提供平等的覆盖范围而开始报告(政治)冲突。这种报告风格是今天体现了一些跨越印刷,广播和电视的最着名的美国媒体机构:纽约时报, 这华盛顿邮报时间新闻欢呼, 这大西洋CBSNBC.CNN.,NPR等人。

然而,从20世纪中叶开始,随着民权运动的崛起,民主党和共和党党派在意识形态上排序,民主党人变得更加自由,共和党人变得更加保守。通过分类,媒体的“从无处可见的观点”,即新闻停止的党派,特别是保守派,他们开始(可理解地)指责主流媒体机构展出“自由偏见”,因此寻求创造自己的媒体网点。部分通过监管变革,如废除公平主义,这导致了替代右翼媒体网点的兴起,如有线电视 - 新闻渠道和保守的谈话广播和消费的受众(通常是专门)。

三个特征将这种保守派媒体生态系统与已建立的主流融合。首先,保守派媒体网点通常完全依据表明主流媒体和学者“偏见”,而不一定关注产生新事实的新闻规范。这就是说,他们更感兴趣地撕毁别人的信誉,而不是建立自己的新闻。其次,正如历史学家妮可·哈姆默认为,保守媒体训练了其受众,以促进强调思想纯度的新闻。2因此,保守受众倾向于寻找党派而不是信息新闻,其中许多人都有不再消耗任何主流报告。第三,最重要的是,作为政治科学家马特格罗斯曼和大卫霍普金斯H.ave pointed out,保守派媒体机构对共和党党的影响力,主流媒体根本不在民主党人身上。共和党政客 - 现任者或改革者 - 被迫寻求媒体个性的批准,而没有谁没有借给小学选民和活动家的方式。(实际上,似乎是镜面保守媒体愤怒风格的媒体个性成为共和党总统提名人。)

Conservative media outlets thus end up turning any policy issue into a politicized culture war, since there is always some conservative value that, as David Hopkins描述他们为他们的观众构建的世界,处于“来自民主党政客”,自由利益和主流新闻媒体的“不可行的袭击事件”受到毁灭或灾难性转型。“(奇怪的是,还有逻辑上,这也是如此,当时共和党人掌权时,霍普金斯观察到,当更多的关注继续致力于“批评民主党人和非保守媒体,而不是庆祝保守派选举或治国的成功。”)

在奥巴马拉尔的“个人授权”的故事中,愤怒框架最可见,这使得所有美国居民必须购买(补贴)健康保险(或被罚款,因为未能这样做)。作为保守的市场的替代品出现出遗产基金会的个人授权,这些替代方案将为美国保健在私营部门,并且确实是马萨诸塞州米特罗姆尼医疗改革的核心。但是一旦它成为奥巴马医结果的一部分,保守媒体网点将其从一个artacane政策工具转向攻击“自由”本身。As Republicans turned against it one by one, state Republican lawmakers filed a case against the mandate as inherently unconstitutional that made its way, securing victory after victory, all the way to the Supreme Court, before Justice John Roberts—barely—found it constitutional as a tax. The conservative media’s ability to set the Republican agenda through its lens of outrage makes it almost impossible for any GOP politician to negotiate in good faith on any nuts-and-bolts issue of governance.

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大局:误导社会

由Victor Bathard.

What is to be done? Social psychologists along with historians, anthropologists, sociologists, and other social scientists must first convince policy makers and the broader public that persuasion is difficult, at the best of times. Yes, Cambridge Analytica abused its privileges as a third-party Facebook application (and Facebook’s lax regulation of third-party developers allowed it to do so), but it had no魔术食谱通过它“操纵”人们支持唐纳德特朗普。Facebook或Twitter也没有秘密酱,他们通过它们“劫持我们的思想”,作为流行的纪录片社交困境似乎是建议的。The power of social-media platforms comes less from their ability to change someone’s mind and more from the way in which their size, reach, and ability to combine different types of speech (advertisements versus organic content, commercial versus journalistic speech, personal versus public speech, etc.) in the pursuit of “virality” and profit allows old and new media institutions to connect with audiences and set parameters for political conversations and public trust. As the communication scholars Daniel Kreiss and Shannon McGregor争论,社交媒体的问题不是“误导”或操纵,欺骗欺骗观众那么多,就像右边的政治精英如何使用他们的媒体平台以获得深刻的反作用目的。

这导致了我的第二课程,这是令人信服的政策制定者和其他人媒体极化的答案并不是“教育”社交媒体用户或事实检查。虽然在教授数字识字或事实检查的工具方面没有错,但美国的政治部门不会出现来自缺乏识字的可容易的人群,或因为一方不了解事实。答案必须在标准化中撒谎:获得社交媒体公司,新闻网点(主流和保守),以及其他利益相关者提出一套“新闻”标准,然后确保只有维护这些标准的文章去病毒。

S.ocial psychologists are thus entirely correct on the conservative media’s ability to set agendas, frame issues, and give viewers criteria on which to evaluate politicians—just as they are about the audiences who consume these media, who, far from being unsophisticated, trust them with good reason. But there is nothing one can do at the level of individuals to solve the vicious loop of politicization here. The answer lies less in understanding the human mind and more in reimagining the American political and media ecosystem.

本文被委托Caitlin zaloom.图标

  1. Much of John Jost’s book is about how individuals reason their way to conclusions that favor not themselves but the dominant social group, thereby justifying and perpetuating the (unjust) system. However, the rest of this review will focus much more on “motivated reasoning” than on “system justification.”
  2. 妮可·哈姆默,右边的信使:保守媒体和美国政治的转变(宾夕法尼亚州大学出版社,2016年)。
Featured image created byTraveller_40 / Flickr.